<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Érudit's RSS Feed</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/</link><description>Volume 46, Number 2, 2026</description><atom:link href="http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/rss.xml" rel="self"/><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 03:15:22 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>The Curative Fallacy</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127165ar/</link><description>Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse&lt;br /&gt;The curative fallacy is a unique error in reasoning. It has not yet been identified in fallacy theory, so we propose here an initial statement of how to identify and criticize the error. One commits the fallacy when one reasons that means that would have prevented an unwelcome outcome are also means, after the outcome has come about, for eliminating or mitigating the outcome. That is, one takes prevention to be ipso facto also cure. This reasoning is appropriate under what we call symmetric conditions, where the preventative is also the curative, but it is not appropriate under asymmetric conditions, where the preventative not only does not remediate but can actually make things worse. This fallacy is particularly appealing for political and interpersonal circumstances, and we identify a few examples of it in contemporary intellectual culture.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127165ar/</guid></item><item><title>Critical Thinking, Metacognition, and Dual-Process Theory</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127166ar/</link><description>Vitaliy Nadurak&lt;br /&gt;In this article, critical thinking is interpreted as a type of metacognition aimed at evaluating thinking for compliance with standards of rationality. The author argues that dual-process theory provides a strong theoretical foundation for explaining critical thinking, as it reflects its fundamental idea, explains why it is necessary, and accounts for why people do not always think critically. The article also contends that critical thinking should not be equated exclusively with deliberate thinking and examines its intuitive components, showing that certain aspects of critical thinking can occur automatically.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127166ar/</guid></item><item><title>The Effect of Intensifications Through Rephrasing on Argument Persuasiveness</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127167ar/</link><description>Jennifer Schumann and Steve Oswald&lt;br /&gt;This paper addresses the role of various forms of intensification on the persuasiveness of rephrased statements in argumentative contexts. Study 1 compares rephrasing through adverbial or verbal intensification to repetition, a similar intensifying strategy, regarding the perceived deservingness (correlated to persuasiveness) of stated outcomes. Results show that adverbial intensifiers create the strongest effect, followed by intensified verbs and repetition. Study 2 examines the effectiveness of rephrasing with intensified verbs compared to rephrasing with intensified objects and repetition. Results indicate that intensifications of the verb yield stronger effects on deservingness/persuasiveness, than intensifications of the object and repetition. Overall, rephrasing through intensification seems to strengthen a justification’s persuasiveness.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127167ar/</guid></item><item><title>Argumentative Role Ethics in Islamic Dialogue Theory</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127168ar/</link><description>Rahmi Oruç&lt;br /&gt;Islamic dialogue theory, developed through the Munāẓara tradition, introduces a distinct model of argumentation and a unique type of dialogue not yet captured by existing typologies. While pragma-dialectics upholds a single, idealized normative framework, and dialogue theory distributes norms across multiple types, Stevens (2026) argues that both neglect the ethical responsibilities built into argumentative practice. Building on her account, I show that in munāẓara, argumentative roles are procedurally indeterminate and inherently negotiable. Decisions about sequencing, burden of proof, what counts as a move, and how one flavors a role involve a continuous negotiation of the rights and obligations of each party.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127168ar/</guid></item><item><title>A Pragmatist Framework for Disagreeing Deeply</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127169ar/</link><description>José Andrés Forero-Mora and María José Frápolli&lt;br /&gt;In this paper, we argue that much of the recent discussion on deep disagreement is grounded in a semantic framework that fails to capture how the concept actually works. It overlooks a key point that we aim to emphasize: attributing depth to a disagreement is, at its core, an evaluative act. Drawing on a pragmatist perspective, we propose a more refined framework that reveals how certain terms serve to express—or make explicit—the speaker’s attitudes and intentions in the act of speaking. We argue that this is exactly what occurs when depth is attributed to a disagreement.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127169ar/</guid></item><item><title>Someone it is Good to Argue With</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127170ar/</link><description>Yun Xie and Yiran Wang&lt;br /&gt;This paper discusses virtuous audiences in argumentation, asking “what does the virtuous audience look like”, and “how could they contribute to a fully satisfying argument”? We first propose to conceive the role of audience in a moderate way, as someone who is addressed by the arguer. Then, we argue that an audience would participate in and contribute to an argument by listening and responding to the arguer, and then by improving themselves. On that basis, we develop a conception of the virtuous audience and make a list of virtues that the virtuous audience needs to cultivate. Finally, we take the list as a framework for analyzing different ways in which the audience can behave badly when participating in argumentation.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127170ar/</guid></item><item><title>Authoritarianism on the Front Page: Multimodal Discourse and Argumentation in Times of Multiple Crises in Greece</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127171ar/</link><description>Leo Groarke&lt;br /&gt;This article reviews Dimitris Serafis’ Authoritarianism on the Front Page: Multimodal discourse and argumentation in times of multiple crises in Greece. (John Benjamins, 2023)</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127171ar/</guid></item><item><title>The Logic of Legal Argumentation: Multi-Modal Perspectives</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127172ar/</link><description>Cihua Xu and Chuanrui Zhang&lt;br /&gt;This article reviews Marko Novak’s (Routledge 2024) The Logic of Legal Argumentation: Multi-Modal Perspectives.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127172ar/</guid></item><item><title>Books Received</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127173ar/</link><description>&lt;br /&gt;None</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/informallogic/2026-v46-n2-informallogic010994/1127173ar/</guid></item></channel></rss>