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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Érudit's RSS Feed</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/</link><description>Volume 52, Number 2, Fall 2025</description><atom:link href="http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/rss.xml" rel="self"/><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 03:26:35 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>Incertitude et présomption de bonté dans les premières Lumières allemandes</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126061ar/</link><description>Andreas Blank&lt;br /&gt;In early modern ethics, the presumption of goodness was seen as a solution to uncertainty about the personal qualities of others. What was sought at the time was an explanation of the proper meaning of goodness and what makes the presumption of goodness rational. These questions were discussed insightfully by Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius, and Christian Wolff. However, their discussions led to divergent conceptions of the proper meaning of goodness. Thomasius argued that considering the limits of human rationality favors limiting the presumption of goodness to the presumption of non-delinquency. Pufendorf and Wolff, on the other hand, argued that considerations concerning natural obligations indicate that ethical aspects should be included in the presumption of goodness. What makes these approaches commensurable is the use of common forms of knowledge : “commonplaces” in Pufendorf’s case, “common sense” in Thomasius’s case, and “common notions” in Wolff’s case.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126061ar/</guid></item><item><title>Le savoir précaire</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126062ar/</link><description>Anne-Lise Rey&lt;br /&gt;The article seeks to identify, from the earliest stages of modernity, reflections on the precarious nature of knowledge that do not presuppose that thinking about the limits of our knowledge is proof of our inherent imperfection. It explores the development of a new approach to knowledge that recognises probability as a valid form of knowledge. At the heart of this regime, it is important to distinguish between the probabilism of the Royal Society and the epistemic vertigo experienced by scholars caught between the possible instability of the world and the new order of knowledge. The article compares the conceptualisations of this uncertainty by Boyle and Cavendish, and then by Leibniz and Wolff, to trace the different epistemic attitudes forged in response to it.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126062ar/</guid></item><item><title>L’Ars conjectandi de Jacob Bernoulli et l’objectivité d’une connaissance incertaine</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126063ar/</link><description>Dinh-Vinh Colomban&lt;br /&gt;At the end of 17th century, probability calculus paved the way for the mathematization of moral certainty which led to a rethinking of the classical categories of certainty. Jacob Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi (1713) outlined a new epistemological model based on the mathematical measurement of probability and a new way of approaching the problem of uncertainty of knowledge. Bernoulli’s “art of conjecturing” posits probability as an irreducible property of certain fields and modalities of knowledge, but one that can be objectified through mathematical measurement and thus positively integrated into knowledge as an objective property. Between the practical field of decision-making for action and the theoretical field of natural philosophy, Bernoulli’s art of conjecturing seeks to develop a new epistemological space that challenges these traditional disciplinary boundaries.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126063ar/</guid></item><item><title>Aux origines de l’analyse infinitésimale : un calcul certain aux principes incertains ?</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126064ar/</link><description>Claire Schwartz&lt;br /&gt;Mathematics is often granted a privileged status—that of a science capable of claiming a level of certainty unmatched by any other form of knowledge. For a long time, this certainty was grounded in Euclidean geometry and the arithmetic of natural numbers. However, the development of elementary algebra and later infinitesimal calculus exposed difficulties, even internal contradictions, which necessitated a redefinition of the basis for this certainty. It was as if certain results were being deduced from uncertain—even absurd—principles. This article therefore seeks to explore the question of mathematical certainty considering its historical characterizations, and to identify more specifically the models and solutions that came into conflict during the debates and controversies sparked by the emergence of infinitesimal calculus at the end of the 17th century.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126064ar/</guid></item><item><title>Les métamorphoses du déterminisme : le passage du monde classique au monde quantique chez Gaston Bachelard</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126065ar/</link><description>Quentin Serot&lt;br /&gt;This article offers a reinterpretation of the history of determinism based on Gaston Bachelard’s historical epistemology. Three regimes can be distinguished : the universal determinism of classical physics, based on the unity of time, causality, and substances ; the mathematical determinism of relativity, which pluralizes perspectives by inscribing causality into the formal structure of space-time ; and the technical determinism of quantum mechanics, where probability and phenomenotechnics become the operators of a new rationality. Bachelard’s analysis thus makes it possible to move beyond the alternative between determinism and indeterminism : quantum mechanics does not refute determinism but redefines its meaning, linking it to the technical production of phenomena and to a discontinuous ontology of events. By tracing this transition from Laplace’s demon to Schrödinger’s cat, the article highlights the role of epistemological breaks in the constitution of the “New Scientific Spirit,” where the notion of determinism is reinvented in line with the conceptual and experimental transformations of modern physics.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126065ar/</guid></item><item><title>Toujours à propos de la bibliothèque de Kant et des sources françaises de sa philosophie. Le cas de Voltaire</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126066ar/</link><description>Abderhaman Messaoudi&lt;br /&gt;This article criticizes the usual way of exploiting Kant’s library catalog and the way of considering his readings or sources of information, in order to propose and promote new approaches. It looks at the case of Voltaire’s Kantian readings as a significant example.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126066ar/</guid></item><item><title>L’indispensable langage métaphorique</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126067ar/</link><description>Maurice Lagueux&lt;br /&gt;After reiterating the importance of philosophical debates on the concept of metaphor, the article focuses on an aspect of the issue that has been relatively overlooked by philosophers, namely the function of metaphor in communication. This allows the final sections to highlight the importance of this function, on the one hand in science, even though it remains contested by many, and on the other hand where it is indispensable, although this is not generally recognized, namely in the expression of religious faith.</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126067ar/</guid></item><item><title>Nouveau dépôt d’archives de la Société de philosophie du Québec : une histoire sous le signe de la précarité, de l’engagement et de la collaboration</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126068ar/</link><description>Félix Tremblay</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126068ar/</guid></item><item><title>Précis de Seeing Like a Firm</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126069ar/</link><description>Pierre-Yves Néron</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126069ar/</guid></item><item><title>Au-delà du statut : pour un égalitarisme intégratif dans la critique de la firme : à partir de P.-Y. Néron, Seeing Like a Firm (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2024), 265 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126070ar/</link><description>Morgane Delorme</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126070ar/</guid></item><item><title>Le marché contre l’entreprise : vers une critique libérale de l’ordre conservateur : à partir de P.-Y. Néron, Seeing Like a Firm (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2024)</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126071ar/</link><description>Nathanaël Colin-Jaeger</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126071ar/</guid></item><item><title>Histoire de la méritocratie entrepreneuriale, domination au travail et politiques de l’égalité : quelques remarques sur Seeing Like a Firm</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126072ar/</link><description>Camille Ternier</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126072ar/</guid></item><item><title>L’esprit du conservatisme du commerce : réponse à mes critiques</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126073ar/</link><description>Pierre-Yves Néron</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126073ar/</guid></item><item><title>Enzo Godinot, La Nouvelle Académie, Paris : Hermann, 2025, 426 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126074ar/</link><description>Leo Mitchell</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126074ar/</guid></item><item><title>Gerard Naddaf with Louis-André Dorion, Making Sense of Myth : Conversations with Luc Brisson, Montréal et Kingston : McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2024, 316 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126075ar/</link><description>Jean-Claude Simard</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126075ar/</guid></item><item><title>Charles T. Wolfe et John Symons (dir.), The History and Philosophy of Materialism, Londres et New York : Routledge, 2025, 500 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126076ar/</link><description>François Pépin</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126076ar/</guid></item><item><title>Fabien Jégoudez, Noblesse et éducation dans Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, Bâle : Schwabe Verlag, 2025, 268 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126077ar/</link><description>Nathan Pinier Golfier</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126077ar/</guid></item><item><title>Jean-Baptiste Fournier et Dominique Pradelle (dir.), Lire les Recherches logiques de Husserl, Paris : Vrin, 2025, 408 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126078ar/</link><description>Bruno Leclerq</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126078ar/</guid></item><item><title>Marc-Kevin Daoust et Thomas Mekhaël, L’éthique et le génie québécois, Québec : Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2024, 270 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126079ar/</link><description>Luc Bégin</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126079ar/</guid></item><item><title>Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter et Rach Cosker-Rowland (dir.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, New York : Routledge, 2024, 548 pages</title><link>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126080ar/</link><description>Etienne Marcoux</description><guid>http://www.erudit.org/en/journals/philoso/2025-v52-n2-philoso010877/1126080ar/</guid></item></channel></rss>