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Backsliding on Disability Rights: Bokhari and the Erosion of the Social Model in Ontario Human Rights Law

Anne Levesque
This case commentary critically examines Bokhari v Top Medical Transportation Services, a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario that dismissed a disability discrimination claim on the basis that the applicant’s injury was “transitory” and thus did not meet the definition of disability under the Human Rights Code. The paper argues that the Tribunal's reasoning marks a troubling departure from the social model of disability long embraced in Canadian human rights law. It highlights how the decision reinforces a narrow, medicalized conception of disability and imposes procedural barriers that undermine access to justice. The upcoming judicial review offers an important opportunity to reaffirm disability rights.

Familialism and the Meaning of ‘Spouse’ in Social Assistance Law

Yukiko Kobayashi Lui
Ontario’s two income support social assistance programs disentitle beneficiaries if they enter into spousal relationships with people with more resources than them. By undertaking a survey of the jurisprudence of the Social Benefits Tribunal, the article presents the two main ways in which poor people’s choices about their family lives are constrained through the operation of Ontario’s social assistance regime. The article elucidates how social assistance law, policy and adjudication act as a form of family law for poor people using welfare, and how the constraints it imposes interfere with the autonomy of society’s poorest.

Anishinaabe gikinoo’amaadiwin: A Lifelong Journey Toward the Gift of Knowledge of Truth and Justice

Florence Robert
In Anishinaabe gikinoo’amaadiwin (legal education), law—inaakonigewin—is a way of life, and learning is the practice of inaadiziwin (the Anishinaabe way of life). This paper examines the philosophical, legal, and epistemological foundations of Anishinaabe legal education, which have long been absent from Canadian law schools and only recently begun to receive attention in response to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Calls to Action 28. It begins with inendamowin (philosophy, worldview, way of thinking), grounded in creation stories, language, kinship with all of Creation, and the responsibilities that flow from these relationships. It then turns to inaakonigewin (law), understood not as a set of abstract rules but as a living practice rooted in relational responsibilities and the pursuit of mino-bimaadiziwin (the good life). Gikendaasowin (knowledge) is explored as a dynamic, relational, and spiritually grounded lifelong process acquired through dreams, visions, stories, ceremonies, observation, and engagement with the land and community. Finally, the paper examines gikendaasowinan (ways of knowing and learning), which emphasize experiential and relational modes of learning that engage the heart, mind, body, and spirit. Together, these concepts offer a framework for understanding Anishinaabe legal education and call on law schools to make space for Indigenous laws on their own ontological and epistemological terms.

Legal Estrangement and Tenant Non-attendance at Eviction Hearings

Sarah Buhler
In jurisdictions across the country, it is common for tenants to not participate in their eviction hearings. Yet the thousands of eviction decisions that are generated by Canadian residential tenancies tribunals every year profoundly affect tenants, their families, and whole communities. The fact that the majority of these orders are made following a hearing where the tenant was absent is therefore worthy of attention. This qualitative study sought to address this gap by asking people in Saskatoon about why they did not participate in their eviction hearings. Drawing on the theory of “legal estrangement” developed by Monica Bell, the paper argues that tenants’ non-attendance at eviction hearings is a result of individual and community-held beliefs that the legal process around eviction is unfair, and that these beliefs are rooted in “structural exclusion” by residential tenancies tribunals and eviction law.

The Social Individual and the Limits of Adjudication

Richard Moon
Two very general ideas have shaped my thinking about constitutional law. The first is that most of the rights in the Charter protect or advance different aspects of our relationship or connection with others. We are social beings. Who we are – our identity, our agency – is shaped by our interactions with others. Rights such as freedom of expression, religious freedom, and the right to equality, do not simply protect individual autonomy, but instead protect different aspects of human flourishing within community. The second theme is narrower and more legal and has to do with what we can expect from the courts in the protection of rights or the advancement of the public good. Courts are adjudicative bodies. Their role is to interpret and apply the law – existing law - to the cases that come before them. Because courts are insulated from political pressure, they are well suited to the role of adjudicator – to resolving disputes based on the law. At the same time, because they are independent in this way, courts are poorly suited to the task of general policymaking, or the redistribution of resources. In my writing I have explored both these themes, and the tension between them. In this lecture, I will discuss three Charter rights – freedom of expression, the right to equality, and religious freedom – to illustrate what I mean by the social character of rights and the tension between this understanding of rights and the structure of constitutional adjudication.